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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
JAMES F. DREHER*
By far the most interesting case decided by the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court during the review period in the field of
domestic relations was Simonds v. Simonds,1 a vigorously con-
tested divorce case from Charleston.
It appears that the husband had been an excessive user of
alcohol for many years prior to December 17, 1952. On that
day the wife, claiming that she had reached the end of her
rope in dealing with his drinking, left the family home with
their children. Almost immediately the husband moved to a
hotel and the rest of the family returned to the home. On or
about the same day, the husband surprisingly brought into
existence the legal situation which, some three and one-half
years later, was to cause the Supreme Court to deny the wife
the divorce to which she had been entitled for years. He
stopped drinking. It was admitted in the record that be-
tween December 17, 1952, and December 7, 1953, when the
divorce action was instituted, the defendant had not touched
a drop. Presumably he was still not drinking at the time of
the lengthy references in 1954 and 1955.
The wife's suit for divorce was on the ground of habitual
drunkenness and during the course of the reference she was
allowed to amend her complaint to include the ground of
constructive desertion. The Charleston County Master recom-
mended that the plaintiff be granted a divorce upon both
grounds and that she be awarded a large lump sum alimony
settlement. Judge Brailsford declined to follow the Master's
recommendations and held that neither ground for divorce
was established. In his view, unless habitual drunkenness
continues to the time of the commencement of the action, it is
no legal ground for divorce and there can be no constructive
desertion if the erstwhile offending party has, by reformation,
*Member of the firm of Robinson, McFadden & Dreher, Columbia;
A.B., 1931, The Citadel; LL.B., 1934, University of South Carolina; part
time instructor, University of South Carolina, School of Law, 1946-54;
member Richland County, South Carolina and American Bar Associa-
tions.
1. 229 S. C. 37, 93 S. E. 2d 107 (1956).
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made the home situation such that the offended party could
properly return to it.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Moss, af-
firmed. It held, as Judge Brailsford had, that habitual drunk-
enness is not made out unless the plaintiff shows that the
condition exists "at or near the time of the filing of the
action." This seems to be easily the majority rule of the juris-
dictions which have decided the point without the benefit
of statutory assistance, but we are in a field here where
theoretical arguments abound. No matter which way such a
decision goes, the theorist could show possible injustice in
the rule adopted. Why, it could be asked, should one past, but
uncondoned, act of adultery constitute a ground for divorce,
whether the offender has repented or not, while the ground
of habitual drunkenness, no matter how long existent, is wiped
out by the drinker's going on the wagon for a period of time?
Is abstinence from an illicit liaison less praiseworthy than
abstinence from drink? Is a husband who strikes his wife
forever at fault in the divorce courts, but a husband who has
ruined his family by drink forgiven if he manages to stay
sober for a few months before the summons and complaint
are served?
On the other hand, should not a drunkard be allowed to re-
form and keep his family? Should the law permit one spouse
to hold over the head of the other the threat of divorce for
some past period of alcoholic indulgence on the other spouse's
part? It is obvious that the spirit of the law must conform
to the real situations which exist between the supposed ex-
tremes. Without legislative standards, which many states have
in statutory requirements that "habitual drunkenness" must
exist within a certain stated period prior to the institution
of the action or within "a reasonable time" prior thereto, the
Courts must, of necessity, find and state some socially accept-
able rule. It may be that the rule announced in the Simonds
case may deny a divorce to a grievously wronged party on
occasion, but the Court must have felt that the rule would
avoid more injustices than it caused.
Perhaps the soundest legal argument against the position of
the plaintiff lies in the reasoning expressed by the Circuit
Judge. He held that, unlike physical cruelty and adultery,
which are actual offenses against the other spouse as well as
against the marriage, habitual drunkenness is a "condition"
2
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and is a ground for divorce only because of its interference
with an acceptable married life. Unless that condition is ac-
tually interfering with the continuation of the marriage at
the time suit is instituted, it is not a ground for dissolving
the marriage.
The plaintiff had another string to her bow which just
avoided being a stout one. She claimed that under Machado
v. Machado2 and Mincey v. Mincey3 she was entitled to a di-
vorce on the ground of constructive desertion because the
conduct of the defendant which caused her to leave their home
was in itself a sufficient ground for divorce. The husband's
condition of habitual drunkenness certainly existed on that
date. The Supreme Court disposed of this contention by
simply pointing out that if there was any constructive deser-
tion it occurred on December 17, 1952, and not quite the full
statutory year for desertion had elapsed between that date and
the institution of the action. Suppose it had; would the de-
fendant's abandonment of his objectionable conduct during
the year bar the plaintiff from claiming that she continued
for the year in the status of an offended party and the de-
fendant in the status of a constructive deserter? The Circuit.
Judge had indicated that it would, holding in effect that if
abstinence wipes out habitual drunkenness as a ground for
divorce, it also wipes it out as an offense sufficient to support
constructive desertion.
Plaintiff's counsel maintained in the Supreme Court, par-
ticularly in the petition for rehearing, that Article 17, Section
3, of the Constitution, which is the 1949 Amendment, is self-
executing and that when it says that divorces "shall be al-
lowed on grounds of adultery, desertion, physical cruelty, or
habitual drunkenness", the language is inviolable and neither
the Legislature nor the Courts can limit the constitutional
grant by saying, as the Legislature has done in Section 20-102
of the Code, that desertion is not a ground for divorce unless
it continues for a year or, as the Court has done in this case,
that habitual drunkenness shall not be a ground unless it ex-
ists at or near the time of the bringing of the action. The
Court did not discuss this point, which has been the subject
of much informal legal debate ever since our divorce statute
was passed.
2. 220 S. C. 90, 66 S. E. 2d 629 (1951).
3. 224 S. C. 520, 80 S. E. 2d 123 (1954).
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The other marital discord cases which the Court decided
during the year were run-of-the-mill. Oswald v. Oswald4 was
merely an affirmance of concurrent findings of desertion as a
ground for a divorce. In Harvey v. Harvey,5 there were no
concurrent findings and the Court used its equitable review
powers to reduce a support award. Sanders v. Sanders" was
an appeal from the Circuit Court's refusal to grant a hus-
band's motion for a reduction in the support payments fixed
by a divorce decree. The Court affirmed, applying the settled
principle that neither the remarriage of a divorced wife nor
the resulting betterment of her financial condition is a suffi-
cient ground of itself for reducing the amount which the di-
vorced husband pays to her for the support of their minor
child where there is no proof of any assumption by the sec-
ond husband of the obligation to support the child.
In the field of adoption, we had two cases. Wright v. Alex-
ander7 was simply a finding that the language of the statute
establishing the Domestic Relations Court of Laurens County
did not grant jurisdiction to that court to order the adoption
of minors. Butler v. Whitt s involved the unhappy question
of whether a deeding mother, a pair of dissatisfied foster par-
ents, or the Department of Public Welfare had prior claim
to the custody of a child. The Department of Welfare prop-
erly prevailed and there are no legal issues of interest in the
case.
Parker v. Parker9 involved the question of whether an ad-
ministrator could maintain a Survival Statute action against
his intestate's minor son on account of the son's gross negli-
gence which allegedly caused his father's death while riding
with him in an automobile as a guest. It has been settled for
a long time in this state"° that an unemancipated child has no
right of action against his parent for personal injuries caused
by the parent's negligence. The Court in the present case
had no difficulty in holding that the factors of public policy
which support that rule also prohibit a tort action by a parent
against an unemancipated child. The question therefore be-
came whether the defendant was an unemancipated minor.
4. 230 S. C. 299, 95 S. E. 2d 493 (1956).
5. 230 S. C. 457, 96 S. E. 2d 469 (1957).
6. 230 S. C. 263, 95 S. E. 2d 440 (1956).
7. 230 S. C. 286, 95 S. E. 2d 500 (1956).
8. 230 S. C. 279, 95 S. E. 2d 496 (1956).
9. 230 S. C. 28, 94 S. E. 2d 12 (1956).
10. Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S. C. 517, 155 S. E. 888 (1930).
1957]
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The Court pointed out that emancipation of a child is estab-
lished not only from the acts of the child, but "primarily from
agreement of the parent." Emancipation may be either par-
tial or complete, but partial emancipation will not suffice to
remove the bar to a tort action between parent and child.
It was held that the facts as to the alleged emancipation of
the defendant presented an issue for the jury and the verdict,
which presupposed a finding of emancipation, was sustained,
although the Court recognized that the testimony as to the
emancipation was meager.
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